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Abstract 
Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students’ troubles with 
mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology: students’ beliefs 
about knowledge and learning can hinder them from activating and integrating productive 
knowledge they have.  In this case study of an engineering major solving problems (about 
content from his introductory physics course) during a clinical interview, we show that “Jim” has 
all the mathematical and conceptual knowledge he would need to solve a hydrostatic pressure 
problem that we posed to him.  But he reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates 
common sense.  We argue that his lack of mathematical sense-making—specifically, translating 
and reconciling between mathematical and everyday/common-sense reasoning—stems in part 
from his epistemological views, i.e., his views about the nature of knowledge and learning.  He 
regards mathematical equations as much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and he does 
not view mathematical equations as expressing meaning that tractably connects to common 
sense.  For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and mathematical 
formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish.  We, however, avoid a potential 
“deficit trap”—substituting an epistemological deficit for a concepts/skills deficit—by 
incorporating multiple, context-dependent epistemological stances into Jim’s cognitive 
dynamics.  We argue that Jim’s epistemological stance contains productive seeds that instructors 
could build upon to support Jim’s mathematical sense-making: He does see common-sense as 
connected to formalism (though not always tractably so) and in some circumstances this 
connection is both salient and valued. 
Introduction 
Engineering students often have troubles with mathematical problem solving in their 
courses.  Many instructors and commentators attribute these difficulties to a deficit of skills 
and/or knowledge:  the student is assumed to need training and practice in certain mathematical 
and problem-solving skills or learn the proper concept [1-3].  Others argue that many students 
who have difficulty with mathematical problem solving possess the needed skills and 
knowledge, but fail to activate that knowledge in appropriate combinations because of their 
epistemologies — their views about the nature of knowledge and learning [4],[5].  For example, 
a student who thinks that mathematical equations and conceptual ideas are two disjoint kinds of 
knowledge that don’t “speak” to each other might fail to activate his conceptual knowledge when 
thinking about how to use a given mathematical equation [6]. 
A great deal of research supports the view that math and science students’ epistemologies 
play a major role in explaining their difficulties learning and using mathematics effectively [7-
11]. This paper, a case study of a student who gets stuck while solving a problem during a 
clinical interview, adds to that literature in three ways—all three of which connect to the goal of 
more nuanced descriptions of “what impedes learners’ ability to learn with understanding” [12]. 
First, in addition to showing that “Jim’s” difficulties stem in part from his epistemology, 
we also show that skill/knowledge deficits play no role in his difficulties.  This point warrants 
attention from engineering education researchers and practitioners because, at first glance, his 
difficulty appears to stem from exactly the kind of knowledge/skills deficit commonly used to 
explain difficulties such as Jim’s. 
Second, our case study provides a fine-grained explanation of how Jim’s epistemology 
affects his mathematical problem-solving in a particular episode.  Illustrating a specific 
mechanism of this influence complements the large-N studies showing that certain coarse-
grained epistemological beliefs correlate with certain approaches to learning and using 
mathematics. 
Third, unlike previous literature that describes students’ epistemologies in terms of hard-
and-fast beliefs or stages [6],[7],[13], we show that Jim’s problematic epistemological stance is 
nuanced and can undergo subtle shifts in response to contextual cues.  This point has 
instructional implications:  instead of needing to confront and replace problematic 
epistemological views such as the one Jim initially manifests, instructors can create instructional 
environment that tend to trigger and stabilize the more productive aspects of the epistemological 
views that student already has. 
Connection between Epistemologies and mathematical sense-making  
In this section we define mathematical sense-making for the purposes of this paper and 
then briefly review previous work exploring how certain epistemological views can support or 
hinder students’ mathematical sense-making.   
Mathematical sense-making 
According to engineers, engineering educators, and engineering education researchers the 
effective use of mathematics in engineering cannot be reduced to a list of formal manipulations 
and problem-solving skills  [9],[14-20].  A solid skill set is crucial, of course; but it must be 
integrated into a productive approach toward learning and using mathematics in engineering, an 
approach involving mathematical sense-making [9],[14-16],[21],[22].  Broadly defined, 
mathematical sense-making involves looking for meaning and coherence (i) within the 
mathematical formalism itself and (ii) between the math and the system it describes [6],[11],[21-
23]. This paper focuses on (ii):  the crux of mathematical sense-making, as we will use the term, 
is the propensity and ability to translate back and forth between mathematical relations on the 
page and causal or functional relations in world.  By contrast, in their physics classes, many 
science and engineering majors treat equations as mere problem solving tools to memorize, 
associated with algorithms to be practiced [11],[24]. 
Links between epistemologies and mathematical sense-making 
Intuitively, we might conjecture that mathematical sense-making rests on the 
epistemological belief that equations and operations can be made sense of, that equations “say” 
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something [6],[11],[22]. We now discuss previous work that, taken as a whole, supports this 
conjecture by showing that students’ epistemological views affect whether they engage in 
mathematical sense-making.  
One line of research shows connections between students’ epistemological views and 
their learning of math [9],[11],[26],[25].  For example, Schommer, Cruse and Rhodes [25] 
administered a survey of students’ epistemologies and a survey of their study strategies.  They 
also had students read a passage about statistics.  Students then took a test of their 
comprehension of that material.  Schommer et al. [25] found that a strong correlation between 
students’ comprehension of the passage and their epistemological views about whether 
knowledge is simple (piecemeal) vs. complex (interconnected).  The effect of epistemology on 
learning remained even when the authors controlled for previous knowledge of and exposure to 
mathematics (using SAT scores and previous courses taken) and gender.  Furthermore, the 
students’ epistemological views correlated with their self-reported study strategies.  Although 
this study does not probe students’ mathematical sense-making during problem solving, it 
strongly suggests that epistemology affects whether students take a sense-making approach to 
learning mathematical ideas. 
Schoenfeld [10],[11],[27], who did much of the early work in this area, also documents a 
connection between certain belief abut math and rote approaches to learning and problem solving 
in math.  For example, Schoenfeld [27] investigated college students’ approaches to geometry 
via clinical interviews in which students were presented with questions on geometric proof and 
geometric construction.  Schoenfeld found that students relied on guesses rather than deductive 
ideas to solve a construction problem even though they could correctly demonstrate the 
deductive proofs when asked.  Schoenfeld relates this behavior to a belief that “the processes of 
formal mathematics (e.g. proof) have nothing to do with discovery or invention [10]. Schoenfeld 
[10] also analyzed high school classroom activities to support his argument that curricula and 
assessments, even in top-rated schools, encourage and reward the epistemological stance that 
learning math is a matter of memorizing disconnected algorithms.  For example, preparing 
students (successfully!) for the New York Regents exam in math, in a unit on geometric 
constructions, the teacher emphasized quick, rote production of standard constructions.  There 
was no discussion of how those constructions connect to the proofs students had been doing just 
weeks before.  
Other threads of Schoenfeld’s work [28] establish the importance of metacognition in 
sophisticated mathematical problem solving.  Students at the beginning of his mathematical 
problem solving class tended to choose a problem-solving path and get stuck there, even when 
the path was unproductive.  By contrast, mathematicians — and Schoenfeld’s students after a 
semester in his class — tended to monitor whether a given pathway was productive, and they 
spent more time deliberating with themselves or with other students about the pros and cons of 
various approaches, not just at the beginning of a problem but throughout the process. We 
mention this work because whether a student uses his metacognitive abilities connects closely to 
his epistemological stance.  For instance, if a student doesn’t think equations are supposed to 
make sense, he’s unlikely to ask himself whether an equation is making sense to him.  
Complementing large-N research such as Schommer et al.’s [25] and Schoenfeld’s [27], 
case studies delve more deeply into individual students’ reasoning, elucidating causal 
mechanisms by which epistemology affects mathematical sense-making during problem solving.   
One study, of students in an introductory calculus-based physics course at Berkeley, documented 
how some students consider it appropriate to suspend their common sense about the physical 
world when engaged in mathematical problem solving [6]. All six of the interviewed subjects 
were comfortable with and adept at mathematical manipulations, and they were able to reason 
conceptually.  However, four students displayed the epistemological view that physics 
knowledge (for non-experts, at least) consists mostly of disconnected pieces and that concepts 
are merely cues for the “real” knowledge of physics, which is equations.  Those four students 
tended to use math differently from the other two, who viewed physics knowledge as conceptual 
(but expressible in equations) and as coherently interconnected.  
A particularly clean illustration of the difference comes from comparing Roger and Tony, 
who initially made the same mistake when solving for the acceleration of block 1 in the 
frictionless modified Atwood machine shown here (Figure 1).  
Both Roger and Tony found the force along the direction of motion to be F=m1g-
m2gsin(θ). Then they both proceeded, incorrectly, to separately connect that force to each block 
separately, by writing F=m1a1 and F=m2a2. Their calculations then yielded different accelerations 
for the two blocks, a result both students considered counterintuitive.  At this point, the two 
students’ reasoning diverged.  Roger, who espoused and displayed a “physics is piecemeal 
formulas” stance throughout the six hours of interviews, checked the algebra and decided he was 
“90% sure” that his calculations were correct.  By contrast, Tony, who through six hours of 
interviews espoused and enacted a view of physics as conceptual and coherent, stuck with his 
physical intuition that the blocks must have the same acceleration.  Finding no mistake in his 
algebra, he dug deeper found the error in the equations he had written, realizing that his F refers 
to the net force on the two-block system, not the force on either block alone.  
This episode was indicative of their general approach towards using mathematics.  Tony 
strived to achieve congruence between mathematics and common sense reasoning while Roger, 
though considering such congruence as desirable, chose to reject common sense when it 
conflicted with formal knowledge.  We should note that, throughout multiple problem-solving 
episodes, Tony and Roger were equally adept at mathematical manipulations.  The sophistication 
in Tony’s problem-solving behavior, i.e., his deep engagement in mathematical sense-making, 
stems in part from his epistemological view that mathematical equations express meaning that 
can be reconciled with common sense.  Unfortunately, Roger’s approach to mathematical 
Figure 0  Modified Atwood Machine – as used in Hammer (1994, p 165) 
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problem solving was typical among students at Berkeley [6],[29].  Redish [24] had similar 
experiences with students at Maryland. 
Another case study of a student’s difficulty with mathematical sense-making comes from 
Lising and Elby [30], who like Hammer conducted six hours of interviews with a given student 
but who also observed the student’s classroom behavior during physics tutorials (collaborative 
active learning sessions).  They argued that “Jan’s” difficulty understanding some concepts and 
equations stemmed not from a lack of conceptual or mathematical ability but from “a component 
of her epistemology, her perception of a ‘wall’ between formal reasoning and everyday/intuitive 
reasoning.” [30] In one particular classroom discussion, while working with three other students 
on a tutorial designed to help students reach a conceptual understanding of the electric field 
equation E = F/q, Jan repeatedly comes to erroneous conclusions.  For example, at one point, she 
claims that the electric field depends on the test charge.  At another moment, she says the field 
remains the same with increasing distance from the source charge.  With each, mistake, her 
group mates not only correct the particular error but (re)explain the meaning of E = F/q, where q 
is a “test charge.”  Each time, Jan says she understands, and she seems to believe it; at other 
points, she readily admits when she doesn’t understand something.  So why does she have 
trouble here?  Not because she just plugs and chugs; in her reasoning, she attends to the 
proportionalities and inverse proportionalities between the different variables.  And not because 
of inability or unwillingness to reason conceptually; in interviews, she repeatedly displays good 
conceptual reasoning.  What she fails to do, in class and in interviews, is connect her 
mathematical understanding to physical cause-and-effect relationships.  So, she continues to 
ignore the fact that increasing q also increases F, even when corrected four times by her group 
mates. Lising and Elby explain Jan’s troubles with E = F/q partly in terms of her robust 
epistemological stance that formal and everyday/intuitive knowledge don’t “speak” to each 
other. 
Jim, the student in our case, also has epistemological views that can impede him from 
integrating his everyday/intuitive and mathematical reasoning, as we’ll argue below. 
Epistemological variability in the context of mathematical problem solving 
In explaining students’ mathematical behavior, the research discussed above attributes a 
unitary epistemology: the relevant belief or stance is shown or assumed to be robust and 
consistent, at least within the contexts probed by the study.  Jim, however, exhibits behavior that 
is best explained (we argue) by attributing epistemological variability:  different contextual cues 
and mental states trigger different aspects of his epistemology to become foregrounded.  We now 
briefly review the literature on epistemological variability in math and science students. 
Redish, Hammer and colleagues [31-34] have been formulating and demonstrating the 
explanatory power of a cognitive theory that accounts for epistemological variability in terms of 
the context-dependent activation of locally coherent networks of epistemological “resources” 
(pieces of knowledge about knowledge). Building on this foundation, Bing and Redish [26] 
developed a framework for analyzing how upper division physics majors justify their reasoning 
while solving mathematical physics problems.  They divided the kinds of warrants 
(justifications) used by students into four major categories: 
(1) Invoking authority, often by quoting a rule such as “work is path independent”;  
(2) mathematical consistency, where a regularity in the mathematical formalism is used 
to justify a move or conclusion, e.g., two opposite charges behave like two nearby asteroids 
because both systems follow inverse square laws; 
(3) calculation, where an answer is justified by its emerging from a trustworthy 
algorithm, correctly applied; and 
(4) physical mapping, which focuses on the connections and coherence between the 
mathematical formalism and the described physical system. 
Category (4) corresponds to the aspect of mathematical sense-making we’re focusing 
upon in this paper, while (2) corresponds to another aspect of mathematical sense-making.  In 
Bing & Redish’s framework, these four classes of warrants reflect four epistemological stances.  
For our purposes, two key empirical findings from Bing & Redish deserve emphasis.  One, 
almost every student studied showed epistemological variability, switching amongst the different 
epistemological stances indicated by the four classes of warrants.  Two, students often got 
“stuck” for too long within a given epistemological stance and a corresponding approach to the 
problem, rather than asking themselves if another approach might be more productive.  Taken 
together, these two findings show that what looks in the moment like a stubbornly-held 
epistemological belief about mathematics can turn out to be a locally stable epistemological 
stance, with the student capable of switching to another epistemological stance in response to 
external or internal conceptual or social cues.  We will argue that Jim’s seemingly stubborn 
epistemological stance (when he gets stuck) can shift in response to conceptual cues. 
Gaps in the engineering education literature 
Except for some of Hammer’s [6] interview subjects, all of the research discussed above 
focuses on math and science students, not engineering majors. Within the engineering education 
literature, we found few articles that directly and empirically address how students use 
mathematics in engineering contexts.  This existing research focuses mostly on characterizing 
broad patterns in the student behaviors or their attitudes towards mathematics.  
Atman et al. [35] explore how college freshmen and seniors approach open-ended design 
problems. One result was that both groups of students spend very little time evaluating their 
results and designing alternative solutions.  In this way, they resembled Schoenfeld’s [28] 
“beginner” students who used limited meta-cognition.  Evaluating results and attending to 
alternate strategies connect to students’ sense of what ”using mathematics” is.  Atman et al. do 
not explore in depth what led the students not to allocate time or effort to evaluation and 
alternative solutions.  
Like us, Fadali et. al. [17] explore whether students’ attitudes towards mathematics 
deserve more blame for students’  difficulties than mathematics deficiencies do.  So far, their 
efforts have been directed towards design and validation of an attitudes assessment tool.   
More recently, Cardella [18],[36] has explored engineering undergraduate and graduate 
students’ mathematical reasoning in Capstone design projects and as part of long-term projects in 
industry partnerships.  Cardella has emphasized the need to incorporate students’ beliefs and 
attitudes along with the mathematical knowledge base to better understand students’ activities in 
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these contexts.  But this work does not explore the fine-grained dynamics of context and 
cognition that guides students’ moment-to-moment decisions. 
Though many studies acknowledge the need to improve how students use mathematics in 
problem-solving, engineering design, and modeling [37-39], there are few engineering education 
articles that analyze the details of students’ reasoning during problem solving (or when they are 
stuck) in real time [18].  Our case study helps to fill this gap, in a way that complements the 
work of Atman et al.[35], Cardella[18],[36], and Fadali et al.,[17] by fleshing out one causal 
mechanism by which a student’s epistemological stance can hinder mathematical sense-making. 
 Methods 
Our qualitative research methods reflect both the goals of this study and the limitations of 
all case studies.  First, our analysis cannot significantly add to the evidence that epistemologies 
affect how students learn and use math, but it can illustrate one mechanism for how the effect 
occurs.  This illustration can add to previous arguments [6],[25],[30] for increasing the role of 
epistemology in our diagnoses of student difficulties with learning to use mathematics in 
science/engineering problems.  Second, this work illustrates (but cannot prove, as a general rule) 
the explanatory power of viewing epistemologies not as globally robust beliefs or theories that 
consistently drive students’ learning and problem solving, but rather, as context-dependent local 
coherences of thought whose stability depends on external cues and on the student’s conceptual 
and even emotional state.  
Background information and subject selection 
Jim is one of seven engineering majors we clinically interviewed in fall 2008, for the 
NSF-funded project Improving students’ mathematical sense-making in engineering:  research 
and development.  All were taking the freshman first-semester calculus-based introductory 
physics course at a large mid-Atlantic State university.  The interviewer was not involved in 
teaching the course.  In all cases, we saw evidence of epistemology affecting the student’s use of 
mathematics.  Jim’s was the first interview we transcribed and analyzed in detail.  We selected 
him for this case study because the interview yielded ample data bearing on mathematical and 
conceptual reasoning skills and his approaches to solving problems, enabling us to critically 
evaluate multiple explanations for his behavior when he got stuck.  We focused initially on the 
“getting stuck” episode because our project was focusing at that time on factors that impede 
mathematical sense-making. We should note that Jim was typical of our subjects in his ability to 
solve the problems we posed.   
Interview Protocol 
To explore what facilitates or hinders engineering students’ mathematical sense-making 
in introductory physics courses, the interviews focused on how students explain (to themselves 
and others) and use physics equations when solving physics problems.  In keeping with this 
objective, the interview context reflected that of the classroom in some ways:  Interviews 
occurred in the Physics building and addressed equations and concepts from their course.  In this 
way, we hoped that the obstacles to mathematical sense-making observed in the interview would 
relate to the obstacles cued by their course work, making our findings instructionally relevant. 
Appendix A lists the complete interview protocol; but the conversational flow in 
particular moments suggested on-the-fly modifications to these prompts, or construction of new 
prompts, to probe the student’s thinking more deeply.  In such moments, we prioritized pursuing 
the student’s thoughts over strictly adhering to the interview protocol.  Of course, when 
analyzing our interview of Jim, the degree of standardization across different interviews becomes 
irrelevant.  
The interview starts by asking students to explain an equation that they are familiar with: 
v = v0 + at, referring to velocity, acceleration and time.  We tried to cue different pockets of 
students' knowledge with prompts such as, "How would you explain that equation to a friend 
from your English class?" or, "How would you explain that equation on a physics exam?"  
Subjects then solved a problem using that equation.  We followed up by asking the subjects to 
make sense of an equation that is similar in structure but new to the students at the time of the 
interview: the hydrostatic pressure equation, p = pat top + ρgh, where p is the pressure under water 
in a lake or ocean, pat top is the pressure at the top, ρ is the density of water, g is the acceleration 
due to gravity and h is the depth below the water’s surface. We then posed a problem that could 
clearly be solved using that equation. 
Analysis 
We began with close analysis of the raw video and transcript of the segment of interview 
where Jim gets stuck solving a problem using the hydrostatic pressure equation, and then, a few 
minutes later, when he gets unstuck.  Although we weren’t building theory, our analysis 
borrowed from “grounded theory” [40],[41] the goal of generating possible explanations for why 
Jim got stuck and unstuck without relying on pre-conceived categories. However, we were 
inevitably influenced by our familiarity with possible explanation from previous work, including 
epistemological issues and skill deficits.  In trying to describe Jim’s thinking, we attended not 
just to the literal meaning of his statements, but also to other markers of his thinking suggested 
by the discourse and framing analysis literature [42],[43], including word choice, pauses, pitch 
and register, body language, and so on. 
After formulating plausible explanations of Jim’s thinking in the selected snippets, we 
then searched the rest of the interview for segments that could help to confirm or disconfirm our 
explanations [44]. 
To increase the accuracy and accountability of our analyses, we did much of the above 
analysis in a larger (five-person) group, arguing about the snippets.  The five members 
commonly disagreed with each other.  Burkhardt and Schoenfeld [45] discuss the advantages of 
group analysis.  Second, we make the entire interview transcript available (NOTE TO EDITORS 
AND REVIEWERS: WE ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR A SECURE PERMANENT 
SERVER FOR THIS) so that readers of this journal can check their own interpretations against 
ours.  Finally, in our arguments below, we present and analyze key segments of interview data, 
enabling the reader to evaluate our arguments against her own readings of the data.  For this 
reason, in what follows, we do not fully tease apart our data and analysis/discussion.  
Our focal episode:  Jim gets stuck  
In this section, we present the focal episode of this article:  The interviewer, Ayush 
Gupta, asks whether the pressure 7 meters beneath the surface of a lake is greater than, less than, 
or equal to the pressure 5 meters beneath the surface.  Jim uses the equation p = pat top + ρgh, to 
which he had just been introduced, Jim makes a sign error and ends up concluding that the 
pressure is greater at a depth of 5 meters.  He sticks to this answer despite realizing that it 
violates the common-sense idea that the pressure is higher at greater depths.  In the following 
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paragraphs, we present an overview of how Jim and Ayush interact trying to resolve the error.  
The transcript segments are time-stamped (min min: second second) . 
Jim makes a sign error 
When first posed the question, Jim spends a few seconds thinking quietly about it.  
Prompted by Ayush, he explains that he is trying to figure out how to plug the given quantities 
into the equation to compute the pressures at the two points.  Ayush offers to let him know the 
value of any quantity, such as the density of water.  At that moment, Jim expresses confusion 
about which sign to use for h: 
[24:01] Jim: Wait, it is under water, does under water mean that h is 
negative?  
Ayush: So it is set up so that h is the distance below the water. 
Jim: Which means it is negative. 
Ayush: Um,  
Jim: Depends on where your axis are 
Ayush: In this situation, the way h is mentioned, is that h is defined as 
going down from the water surface 
Jim: So then five is bigger and seven is smaller 
Ayush: Why do you say that? 
Jim: Because if it’s going down then it is negative 
Ayush: What is negative? 
Jim: h is negative and this is a smaller number and five is a bigger number 
Ayush: Because of the negative? 
Jim: Yeah.     
[24:51]  
 
Jim decides that h must be negative since it is increasing downward, possibly because of 
the convention often used in physics problems of taking the vertically down direction to be 
negative, and possibly due to miscommunication between him and Ayush.    
Jim sticks to his formal result and defends it 
Over the next six minutes, Jim sticks to the idea that h should be negative on account of 
its direction, and the pressure is greater at a depth of 5 m than at a depth of 7 m.  For example, 
when the interviewer explicitly suggests that h be taken as positive, Jim agrees that it would lead 
to the conclusion that pressure is higher at a depth of 7m compared to 5m, but he seems 
uncomfortable with this idea and does not take it up. 
 
[29:56] Ayush: Suppose I told you that h is positive.  
Jim: Always positive? 
Ayush: Yes, So I am taking the positive distance from the surface, but its 
considered positive. Would that help you? 
Jim: I mean, that would just make 7 greater than 5. 
Ayush: Okay. Does that bother you? 
Jim: I mean... What I keep thinking is that you are going down (gestures 
down) so 7 cannot be greater than 5 and negative. That's why I keep 
coming back to that. Meaning, if you do say it's positive then ... I guess it 
doesn't bother me. (sighs) 7 is greater than 5 in positive-land.  
[30:55] 
 
Jim is skeptical about Ayush’s suggestion that h is positive, given that its direction is 
down from the surface.  Jim sighs as he tries to accept that idea and perhaps tries to distance 
himself from it by saying it’s true in “positive-land,” a notion he introduces with sarcasm in his 
voice.  In the conversation that follows, Jim reverts to the idea that h should be negative. 
Jim’s “stickiness” in his conclusion that the pressure is greater at a shallower depth calls 
for explanation because he knows this answer contradicts common sense.  Below, we present the 
short segment in which Jim describes how relying on everyday experience would lead to the 
conclusion that the pressure increases with depth.  After that segment, Ayush probes whether Jim 
sees the contradiction: 
 
[28:20] Ayush: So do you think that the mathematics here is telling you 
something different [from perceptual experience]? 
Jim: Yeah, I think it is. 
Ayush: Okay, okay. So suppose you were to answer this question on an 
exam, which one would you pick - the experience one or the math? 
 [28:35]  Jim: I will pick the mathematics. 
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Below we present Jim’s reason for choosing the mathematics.  For now, our point is that, 
despite the interviewer’s prompts, he never makes an attempt to reconcile the math with the 
common-sense answer, beyond double checking that he was using the hydrostatic pressure 
equation correctly. 
In summary, Jim exhibits some common, previously-documented behaviors: not seeking 
a reconciliation between everyday experiences and formal mathematics — i.e., not 
mathematically sense-making — and favoring formal over everyday thinking [6],[24],[30].  
Mathematical sense-making in this episode might have led Jim to take more seriously the 
possibility that h is positive, since then the equation would agree with common sense, or to look 
for another way to reconcile common sense with his mathematical result.   
We now turn to explaining why Jim does not successfully engage in mathematical sense-
making during this episode.  
What does not explain Jim?s behavior:  Skill/knowledge deficits 
In this section, we systematically rule out several plausible explanations for Jim’s 
behavior, explanations based on his holding a robust misconception or on his lacking the needed 
knowledge or skills.  Specifically, we will show that Jim’s lack of mathematical sense-making in 
the above episode does not stem from:  
(i) misconceptions about coordinate systems (e.g., the idea that down must be 
negative), 
(ii) lack of (or incorrect) conceptions about pressure, 
(iii) underdeveloped mathematical manipulation skills, 
(iv) inability to connect math and physics ideas, or 
(v) unwillingness to revisit an answer, perhaps connected to unwillingness to 
admit he made a mistake. 
The interview segments we presented above, and will present below, are not all in 
chronological order.  To provide a sense of the overall conversational flow, and to situate the 
segments we analyze, we summarize the conversation in Table 1. 
(i)  Jim does not have a fixed conceptualization of 'down as negative' 
Given Jim’s persistent adherence to the idea that h must be negative since "it is down 
from the surface of water,” we might attribute to him an entrenched misconception about 
coordinate systems: that downward must always correspond to negative.  Jim, however, does not 
possess this misconception.  Evidence for this claim comes from other problem-solving episodes 
in the interview.  
In one such episode, Jim is solving the “two-ball problem”: 
[07:16] Ayush: [H]ave a look at this problem here. um. it says that you are 
standing on the fourth floor and you are throwing the ball down with an 
initial speed of 2 m/s and you are letting go of another ball. okay. So, its 
asking you that after 5 seconds, what would be the difference in speeds of 
the two balls. Will it be less than, more than, or equal to 2 m/s? 
 In solving this problem, Jim productively, though tacitly, chose ‘down’ as the positive 
direction, assigning positive values to the initial velocity of the thrown ball and the acceleration 
due to gravity, g.  This counts as evidence against his holding a misconception about coordinate 
systems, not simply because he takes downward as positive but because in doing so he avoids a 
coordinate-system error that students commonly make, treating the acceleration due to gravity as 
automatically negative, without checking for consistency with the other quantities. 
Our data do not rule out the following more nuanced explanation of Jim’s behavior:  
Certain cues cause Jim to activate a strong connection between his physical sense of “down-
ness” and his mathematical sense of “minus.”  The two-ball problem does not activate this 
connection, perhaps because the salient feature of the problem to Jim is that the initial velocity 
and the acceleration caused by gravity go in the same direction; it’s not salient to him in the 
moment that the direction happens to be downward.  In the pressure scenario, by contrast, it is 
extremely salient to Jim that h is measured downward from the water’s surface.  By this account, 
Jim’s difficulty arises not from a globally robust misconception about coordinate systems, or 
from a gap in his knowledge about coordinate systems, but rather, from the context-dependent 
strength of the connection between two elements of his thinking, his physical sense of downness 
and his mathematical sense of negative. 
We actually endorse this account as a partial explanation of Jim’s behavior.  In doing so, 
we do not contradict our central claims, because: 
(1) As just emphasized, we are not ascribing a knowledge deficit or a global 
misconception to Jim; in some contexts, he “knows” that downward can be positive, but he’s not 
accessing that knowledge in the hydrostatic pressure problem. 
(2) The coordinate-system-based explanation of Jim’s behavior cannot be the whole 
story, for the following reason. As discussed below, Jim eventually does resolve the 
contradiction between his common sense and his mathematical result, in response to a prompt 
from Ayush.  Jim achieves the reconciliation using reasoning tools and knowledge he already 
had available before Ayush’s intervention, and without giving up the idea that h is negative.  
Epistemological considerations, we will argue, are what prevent Jim from finding that 
reconciliation on his own.    
(ii) Jim has sufficient conceptual understanding of pressure for this problem 
Based on Jim's defense of his result that greater depth corresponds to lower pressure, we 
might think that Jim lacks sufficient understanding of pressure to see the intuitive problem with 
his answer.  But when asked how a friend from English class would reason, Jim shows an 
understanding that, intuitively speaking, pressure should increase with increasing depth: 
[26:03] Ayush: Jim, suppose, um, let me ask another question. Suppose 
there was a friend of yours in English, right, not doing physics, so does not 
really know physics, and equations kind of thing. Could they have 
answered this question?  
Jim: This question? 
Ayush: Just he question that you know, under water, is the pressure 
greater than, less than, or equal to at a depth of 7 m versus a depth of 5m, 
could they answer that without really knowing physics? 
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Jim: Not unless they have experience being under water themselves. If 
they have, then they can.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Ayush: Okay. Then. So. What do you mean when you said that they have 
experience? 
Jim: Like, if they have actually been under water, so the pressure, they 
might know a little bit about pressure under water. 
Ayush: Umm .. 
Jim: Like they have gone snorkeling under water 
Ayush: What would they know? 
Jim: Like a rough estimate. The pressure was higher when I was deeper. 
[Ayush: okay] The pressure was lower when I was higher to the surface.  If 
they can actually work it in a equation, I do not think they will be able to. 
Ayush: So, given that information, given that experience, could they have 
argued which pressure would be more - 7m or 5 m? 
Jim: I mean. 
Ayush: Not from equations maybe 
Jim: Just from that. I mean they could argue it 
Ayush: What would they argue then? 
Jim: They could argue from their personal experience like, One time I was 
scuba diving and I was like 30 feet below the water and pressure was like, 
pressure was very high. Like I was just swimming, I was just couple of feet 
below the water and the pressure was not that much. 
Ayush: So they would say that pressure at 7 m.  
Jim: Yes, is greater. [Ayush: is greater.] But they are not factoring in the 
negative sign of h.    [28:17] 
 
In brief, Jim’s experiences indicate that the pressure at greater depths exceeds the 
pressure at shallower depths. We are claiming not that Jim has a deep understanding of pressure, 
but rather, that his understanding is more than adequate to answer the interview question 
correctly.  He rejects his (correct) experience-based conclusion not because his experience-based 
reasoning is ambiguous or incorrect, but rather, because it is “not factoring in the negative sign 
of h.” 
(iii) Jim fluidly performs mathematical manipulations 
Jim quickly and correctly reasoned that, assuming h is positive (and all the constants are 
positive), the equation p = pat top + ρgh implies that the pressure is greater at a depth of 7 meters 
than at a depth of 5 meters.  He also solved the two-ball problem correctly, exhibiting no 
difficulties.  Our point is that lack of mathematical problem-solving skills does not explain why 
Jim reaches and sticks with his incorrect conclusion about pressure. 
 (iv) Jim can connect mathematical results to physical implications  
Another explanation for Jim’s sticking with his conclusion that the pressure is greater at 
shallower depths could be that he has trouble relating mathematical conclusions to physical 
common sense. We saw above, however, that Jim knows that his mathematical reasoning, 
according to which greater depth corresponds to lower pressure, contradicts the intuitive answer 
that someone with “personal experience” under water would give.   
(v)  Jim is willing to change his mind 
Some of Jim’s behavior while he’s sticking to his mathematical answer (at the expense of 
the experience-based answer) suggests that he might be resisting the interviewer by “stubbornly” 
sticking to his initial answer.  Evidence supporting this explanation includes his sighing, 
sarcastic reaction to Ayush’s suggestion that h is positive (“7 is greater than 5 in positive-land”); 
his clenched posture during parts of the ensuing conversation; and his quick, forceful statement 
that he “will pick the mathematics” on an exam, when choosing between the mathematical and 
the experience-based answer, which contrasts with the long, thoughtful pauses that occur before 
many of his other answers throughout the interview. [NOTE TO EDITORS/REVIEWERS: WE 
WILL TRY TO POST VIDEO CLIPS FOR READERS; TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR 
SECURE SERVER].  If a conversational dynamic of opposition exists here, it could be enhanced 
by Jim’s life experiences as an African American male in a field traditionally dominated by other 
racial/ethnic groups, in a K-12 and college schooling environment that in many cases ignores or 
even devalues cultural resources that African American students bring to bear [46]. 
We agree that the conversational dynamic in this segment of the interview, with Ayush 
continually prodding Jim to rethink his answer, probably contributes to Jim’s “stickiness” in his 
answer.  But this stickiness cannot fully explain why he doesn’t attempt to reconcile his 
mathematical and experience-based answer.  Our evidence is that Jim does change his mind, 
quickly and eagerly, in response to a particular prompt from Ayush: 
[34:40] Ayush: What do you think about g in [the hydrostatic pressure] 
equation? Should that be minus ten or plus ten? 
Jim: Oh! minus ten ... So, that gives you a positive thing. [Ayush: Okay.] I 
would say that the negative does not matter anymore. Oooh! I see.  The 
higher you go under water, uh, the lower you go under water the more 
your pressure is, because the negative and the negative cancel out ... So, 
the more under water you are the higher your pressure is going to be, I 
think now. I forgot to factor in g. That’s what I think. 
Ayush: Okay.  Is that more comfortable or less comfortable? 
Jim: That is more comfortable because it actually makes more sense to 
me now. And now your experience actually does work because from your 
experience being under water you felt more pressure as opposed to the 
surface. If I take into consideration both negatives, it is just positive, they 
just add up.   [36:08] 
 
Notice that Jim not only gets excited about finding a reason to reverse his earlier 
conclusion about how pressure changes with depth (“Oh!”, “Oooh!”), but also readily admits to 
making a mistake earlier:  “I forgot to factor in [the negative direction of] g.”  Furthermore, he 
says that this revised answer “is more comfortable.”  This is evidence that (i) Jim’s earlier 
clenched posture stemmed at least in part from his feeling uncomfortable with his earlier answer, 
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and (ii) any earlier apparent resistance he was exhibiting to rethinking his answer did not reflect 
a general unwillingness to revisit and revise his thinking or a robust stubbornness about changing 
his answer. 
So, why was Jim so “sticky” in his conclusion that grater depth corresponds to lower 
pressure, at least until Ayush’s prompt about the sign of g?  We take up this issue in the next 
section. 
What does explain Jimʼs behavior:  epistemology 
In this section, we first argue that Jim gets stuck and stays stuck in his incorrect answer 
partly because he doesn’t engage in key aspects of mathematical sense-making.  Then we argue 
that his lack of mathematical sense-making is driven in part by his epistemological stance.  
Jim doesn’t engage in key aspects of mathematical sense-making 
Mathematical sense-making — specifically, translating and reconciling between 
mathematical and everyday/common-sense reasoning — might have helped Jim (re)solve the 
pressure problem on his own.  Upon noticing the contradiction between his assumption that h is 
negative and the common-sense conclusion about how pressure depends on depth, he might have 
been more willing to rethink the conceptual meaning of h and hence to question his assumption 
about the sign of h, instead of brushing aside the idea that h could be positive.  This deeper 
questioning might have led him to tap into his knowledge, exhibited in the two-ball problem, that 
downward can correspond to positive.  Alternatively, thinking about why g appears in p = pat top 
+ ρgh might have led him to think about the sign of g.  Looking at the structure of the expression 
pat top + ρgh and thinking about the physical implications of a negative ρgh — that the pressure 
everywhere under the water is less than the pressure at the top — might have led him to check 
his signs more carefully.  Of course, these instantiations of mathematical sense-making might not 
have worked for Jim.  Our point, however, is to explain why he didn’t even try any of these 
avenues.  We argued in the last section that his failure to attempt deeper mathematical sense-
making did not stem from misconceptions about coordinate systems, insufficient understanding 
of pressure, underdeveloped mathematical skills, inability to connect math and physics ideas, or 
unwillingness to change his answer.  Instead, we now argue, Jim’s epistemology explains the 
absence from his reasoning of key features of mathematical sense-making. 
Jim’s epistemological stance pushes him away from mathematical sense-making 
During the interview, Jim (a) regards mathematical reasoning as much more trustworthy 
than everyday common-sense reasoning, and (b) does not see mathematical equations as 
expressing meaning that is tractably connected to everyday/common-sense reasoning.  These two 
features of his epistemological stance, we argue, help to cause and/or sustain a tendency to focus 
on the syntax of mathematical manipulations rather than the conceptual meaning of mathematical 
equations and expressions and how to reconcile that meaning with everyday common-sense 
reasoning.  In other words, Jim’s epistemological stance, specifically (a) and (b) above, pushes 
him away from aspects of mathematical sense-making that might have helped him troubleshoot 
his reasoning without needing Ayush’s prompt.  
(a)  Jim regards mathematical reasoning as much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning 
Jim articulates the view that mathematical reasoning is much more trustworthy than 
everyday/common-sense reasoning immediately after describing how an English-major friend 
would respond to the question of whether the pressure is greater at 5 meters or 7 meters.  Recall 
from above that, according to Jim, the English major would say the pressure is larger at greater 
depths:   
 
[28:20] Ayush: So do you think that the mathematics here is telling you 
something different [from the English major’s based-based answer]? 
Jim: Yeah, I think it is. 
Ayush: Okay, okay. So suppose you were to answer this question on an 
exam, which one would you pick - the experience one or the math? 
 Jim: I will pick the mathematics. 
Ayush; Mathematics. Can you tell me why? 
 Jim: Uh, for mathematics. For an equation to be given to you it has to be 
like theory and it has to be fact-bearing. So, fact applies for everything. It 
is like a law. It applies to every single situation you could be in. But, like, 
your experience at times or perception is just different - or you don’t have 
the knowledge of that course or anything. So, I will go with the people who 
have done the law and it has worked time after time after time.   [29:15] 
 
Here, Jim says that perceptions can be misleading at times, but that “for an equation to be 
given…it has to be fact-bearing” and hence “applies for everything…like a law.”  The reason to 
trust the equation as law-like is that “people…have done the law and it has worked time after 
time…”  So, mathematics encode authoritatively verified truths that are much more trustworthy 
than a given person’s perceptions. 
Jim’s statements and actions throughout the interview mesh with this epistemological 
view.  Solving the two-ball problem, for instance, he considers his mathematical answer 
adequate without checking whether it agrees with common sense.  And even with the pressure 
question, when Jim resolves the contradiction between mathematical formalism and the 
common-sense answer, the resolution is grounded in formalism:  Jim concludes that since g and 
h are both negative, ρgh is positive and hence the pressure,  p = pat top + ρgh, increases with 
depth.  Nowhere in the interview does Jim express or enact the idea that common-sense 
reasoning could challenge or make him reconsider mathematical reasoning. 
(b)  Jim does not see mathematical equations as expressing meaning that is tractably connected 
to everyday/common-sense reasoning  
 As emphasized above, Jim sees his mathematical answers and his everyday/common-
sense reasoning as talking to each other; they can agree or disagree, and if they disagree, a choice 
must be made.  But he does not see mathematical equations as expressing meaning that tractably 
connects to his common-sense reasoning.  In other words, he does not see mathematical 
equations in physics as expressing conceptual content that can inform or be informed by 
everyday/common-sense reasoning.   
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To be clear, we do not claim that Jim consciously holds this view.  Epistemological 
stances can be tacit, exhibited through patterns of behavior [31],[47],[48].  Evidence for Jim’s 
(tacit) epistemological stance comes mostly from the way he reasons with equations.  The 
examples we now give reflect a pattern that was consistent throughout the interview. 
When asked to explain the equation for the velocity of an object moving with constant 
acceleration, v = v0 + at, Jim notes the equation can be obtained either by taking the derivative 
of a certain equation for position, or by integrating of a basic equation for acceleration: 
 
[2:00] Jim: Velocity equals the initial velocity plus acceleration times time. 
The equation for speed and it comes from the derivative of position or the 
integral of acceleration. That is how I will explain it.  
 
Several other interviewees, by contrast, started by defining the variables (as Jim did) but 
went on to try to explain why the equation makes sense, such as why acceleration is multiplied 
by time, or what the overall equation says in common sense terms (e.g., the final velocity is the 
initial speed plus however much velocity you gain because you’re accelerating).  
We can’t attribute Jim’s behavior here solely to the task structure of explaining rather 
than actually using an equation.  When solving the two-ball problem using that equation, Jim 
adeptly performs mathematical manipulations to get the right answer:  the thrown ball is moving 
2 m/s faster than the dropped ball after they have both been falling for the same time.  Ayush 
then asked if some one could have answered that question without all the calculations.  Some 
other interviewees, in response to this follow-up prompt or in response to the original question, 
saw a shortcut stemming from the physical meaning of v = v0 + at:  since both balls gain the 
same velocity in a given time (with the gain given by at), and since the thrown ball starts out 2 
m/s faster than the other (the difference in their v0’s), the thrown ball is still going 2 m/s faster 
than the other 5 seconds later.  But Jim said that without going through the math there was no 
way to get to an answer. 
Similarly when asked how he would try to explain the hydrostatic pressure equation to 
himself, Jim checks that the dimensions work our properly — a productive first step in making 
sense of an equation.  For Jim, however, it was the only step: 
 
[13:05] Ayush: So this is just an equation about pressure; pressure inside 
water. a lake or ocean or something like that right. it just gives you an 
expression for that in terms of the pressure on top and then the density of 
the water and acc due to gravity, g, and the depth of water from the 
surface h. so suppose you were trying to understand this equation, you 
were trying to make sense of it. how would you go about doing that. 
[For about six minutes: Jim works on the units of the temrs in the pressure 
equation; he asks Ayush about the units of pressure which Ayush provides 
him as Newtons per squared meters; he makes an error but recovers from 
it, and finally convinces himself that the terms in the equation have the 
same units.] 
Jim: ah! it does match. 
Ayush: are you happy? 
Jim: Yeah. /smiles looking at his work/ 
Jim: What do they mean by how would you explain this equation to 
yourself? If I see this, I will first make sure that units match. 
Ayush: Okay 
Jim: What else do they mean by how would you explain this equation to 
yourself? 
Ayush: Um, does this equation make sense to you?  
Jim: The units make sense, so it has to be heading somewhere [okay] 
Ayush: um So suppose we asked you to explain the equation on an 
exam? 
Jim: work out the units and plug it in 
Ayush: okay   [20:46] 
  
So, while some other interviews tried to make sense of (for example) the ρgh term, Jim 
doesn’t think about the conceptual meaning of that term, or of the overall structure of the 
equation, before concluding that the equation makes sense.  
In this subsection, we’ve presented indirect evidence that Jim does not see mathematical 
questions as expressing conceptual meaning, or at least conceptual meaning that is tractably 
connected to everyday/common-sense reasoning.  The evidence has consisted of a consistent 
pattern in his use of equations. At one point in the interview, though, Jim comments on this issue 
more directly.  Taking on the perspective of the English major, he had just concluded that 
common-sense reasoning, based on part of experiences feeling squeezed under water, disagrees 
with his mathematically-based conclusion about the relation between depth and pressure. 
 
[29:17] Ayush: So, okay, so, Jim, do you think this equation relates to [the 
physical experience of pressure]? 
Jim: This one? (points to p = pat top + ρgh on the page) 
Ayush: Yes. Does it relate to that experience? 
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Jim: Probably somehow, but not directly. 
Ayush: Can you tell me how? 
Jim: I think there is some way that just completely links the two together, 
but it's not obvious what that relation is.   [29:50] 
 
Here Jim acknowledges that there is “probably somehow…. some way that just links the 
two [mathematically-based conclusion and experiences under water] together,” but the relation is 
not direct and “not obvious.”  This statement meshes with his consistent behavior in the 
interview of not looking for such connections.  
Jim’s epistemological stance pushes him away from mathematical sense-making during the 
pressure episode 
We’ve just argued that Jim (a) regards mathematical reasoning as much more trustworthy 
than everyday common-sense reasoning, and (b) does not see mathematical equations as 
expressing meaning that is tractably connected to everyday/common-sense reasoning.  These two 
features of his epistemology reinforce each other in pushing him away from a key aspect of 
mathematical sense-making, systematically looking for meaning in and coherence between 
mathematical formalism and the system described by that formalism.  According to view (b), 
such meaning and coherence are unlikely to be found (at least by non-experts); and according to 
view (a), it’s unnecessary to seek that kind of meaning and coherence, at least to solve problems, 
since the mathematical answer can be trusted at the expense of the common-sense answer.   
We outlined above how mathematical sense-making might have helped Jim reach the 
correct answer to the pressure problem, and now we’ve offered a plausibility argument that Jim’s 
epistemological stance causes and/or sustains his failure to engage in math sense-making in this 
episode.  More strikingly, we showed evidence of his epistemological stance affecting his 
behavior in the moment during that episode.  He concluded that p = pat top + ρgh makes sense 
solely on the basis of dimensional analysis, cutting him off from also looking at the conceptual 
meaning of the equation.  He stuck with his mathematical answer even after realizing it starkly 
conflicts with common sense, citing the greater trustworthiness of math.  He didn’t search harder 
for a resolution between his formal reasoning and common sense, and when asked why, cited the 
indirectness and non-obviousness of the connection between the two.  Of course, it could always 
be the case that his epistemological statements in this episode were rationalizations that didn’t 
capture the epistemological stance (if any) actually driving his reasoning in those moments.  The 
plausibility of the causal connections we’re inferring between his epistemological stance and his 
in-the-moment reasoning comes from the overall coherence and parsimony of our account:  the 
epistemological stance we inferred from the pressure episode also helps to account for Jim’s 
reasoning during the rest of the interview, and the in-the-moment causal links we’re inferring 
mesh not only with Jim’s behavior but with previous case studies [6],[30] and larger-N 
correlational studies [25],[27]  
Revisiting Jimʼs epistemology:  nuance and seeds of expertise 
As we’ve depicted it so far, Jim’s epistemological stance is unproductive to his problem-
solving and learning.  In classifying Jim’s epistemology as unproductive or “unavailing” [8], we 
would be fitting into the general trend of literature on students’ epistemologies, which typically 
assigns a globally-robust epistemological “level” to a student, at least within a given discipline 
[7].  Other researchers have argued, however, that even within a given discipline or within a 
given context (such as an interview), fine-grained contextual and conceptual cues can produce 
both subtle and dramatic shifts in a student’s epistemological stance [33],[49],[50]. In this 
section we revisit Jim’s epistemological stance to show that it incorporates more nuance, 
flexibility and seeds of expertise than we depicted above. We are not backing off our argument 
above that aspects of Jim’s epistemological stance during the pressure episode impede his 
mathematical sense-making.  We are arguing instead that even during this episode, Jim’s 
epistemology exhibits productive seeds that well-designed instructional environments could help 
nurture towards epistemological expertise.  As part of our argument, we’ll show evidence that 
Jim underwent a subtle but important epistemological shift (as opposed to merely a conceptual 
shift) in response to Ayush’s hint about the sign of g, a shift with important instructional 
implications.  In this way, we avoid a deficit-based account of Jim’s reasoning, an account that 
simply replaces deficient skills/knowledge deficiency with a “deficient” epistemology. 
Seeds of expertise in Jim’s stance of trusting math as authoritative 
Above, we used the following quotation to argue that Jim views canonical mathematical 
equations as much more trustworthy than everyday/intuitive, on the grounds that such equations 
come from authoritative sources: 
 
[28:39] Jim:  For an equation to be given to you it has to be like theory and 
it has to be fact-bearing. So, fact applies for everything. It is like a law. It 
applies to every single situation you could be in. But, like, your experience 
at times or perception is just different - or you don’t have the knowledge of 
that course or anything. So, I will go with the people who have done the 
law and it has worked time after time after time. 
 
At first glance, Jim’s stance here is one of accepting information from authority, 
specifically from “the people [presumably professional scientists or engineers] who have done 
the law and it has worked time after time.”  Accepting knowledge as absolute and coming from 
authority or direct personal observation is generally taken to be a low stage in someone’s 
epistemological development [51],[52],[13].  But Jim’s stance here is more nuanced.  He is 
accepting the authority of those people because they have “done the law and it has worked time 
after time.” (emphasis added).  So, the trustworthiness of the mathematical equation stems not 
from the credentials of people who promulgate it but rather from repeated empirical tests of the 
law.  Like a professional scientist or engineer, Jim doesn’t feel the need to replicate all these 
experiments for himself; repeated tests done by others is sufficient to make the equation 
trustworthy. 
Nurturing these seeds towards expertise would involve helping Jim see himself as 
someone who can contribute to the formulation and testing of such equations; the 
epistemological resources he needs to understand the purpose and value of this kind of activity 
appear to already be in place. 
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Seeds of expertise in Jim’s views about the connection between formalism and common 
sense 
We showed above that, during the pressure episode before Ayush’s g prompt, Jim doesn’t 
expect mathematical equations to express meaning that is tractably connected to 
everyday/common-sense reasoning.  Here, we show that this stance is nuanced and flexible; it 
contains seeds that, if further developed, will support mathematical sense-making. First, even 
before Ayush’s prompt, Jim does expect a connection between mathematical formalism and 
common sense to exist, even if it’s hard to track.  Second, after Ayush’s hint about the sign of g, 
Jim quickly shifts to a stance in which he expects common sense to mesh tractably with 
mathematical formalism, and he’s clearly more comfortable with this stance.  We now support 
these two points in turn. 
1.  Jim expects a connection to exist between common sense and mathematical formalism.  
Our evidence comes from the passage cited above in which Jim responds to Ayush’s question 
about whether the pressure equation under consideration relates to the physical experience of 
pressure. While emphasizing the intractability of the connection, Jim nonetheless says the 
connection exists: 
 
[29:35] Jim: I think there is some way that just completely links the two 
together, but it's not obvious what that relation is. (emphasis added). 
 
This differs from a more naïve stance according to which mathematical reasoning and 
everyday reasoning exist in completely separate worlds. 
2.  Jim shifts to a (subtly)different epistemological stance in response to a conceptual 
cue.   
As argued above, Jim was uncomfortable during the pressure episode, as indicated by 
long pauses, clenched body posture, and occasional annoyance or sarcasm.  His comfort and 
excitement level changes dramatically, however, in response to the realization that he can 
reconcile the mathematical formalism with common sense: 
 
[34:40] Ayush: What do you think about g in [the hydrostatic pressure] 
equation? Should that be minus ten or plus ten? 
Jim: Oh! minus ten ... So, that gives you a positive thing. [Okay.] I would 
say that the negative does not matter anymore. Oooh! I see.  The higher 
you go under water, uh, the lower you go under water the more your 
pressure is, because the negative and the negative cancel out ... So, the 
more under water you are the higher your pressure is going to be, I think 
now. I forgot to factor in g. That’s what I think. 
Ayush: Okay.  Is that more comfortable or less comfortable? 
Jim: That is more comfortable because it actually makes more sense to 
me now. And now your experience actually does work because from your 
experience being under water you felt more pressure as opposed to the 
surface. If I take into consideration both negatives, it is just positive, they 
just add up. (emphasis added).   [36:08] 
 
Jim is excited that the problematic “negative [sign of h] does not matter any more,” since 
the negative sign of g cancels it out.  He views this realization as an exciting insight — “Oh!”, 
“Oooh! I see” — and gives us an indication of why:  “…because it actually makes sense to me 
now.”  In this moment, he views his mathematical answer as making sense because it meshes 
with everyday experience, not simply because mathematical equations are trustworthy.  
At first glance, this appears to be an affective shift but not an epistemological shift; after 
all, Jim had always maintained that a connection exists between mathematical formalism and 
everyday reasoning, and he is excited to have found that connection.  But a subtle 
epistemological shift has occurred as well.  Before Ayush’s hint, the connection between 
mathematical formalism and common sense was an inert part of Jim’s cognitive ecology; it 
didn’t inform his reasoning, partly because he didn’t expect that connection be something he 
could find.  After Ayush’s hint, by contrast, the connection between mathematical formalism and 
common sense became an active element of Jim’s cognition:  it makes him more comfortable 
than he was before, and drives his sense that his answer “actually makes more sense to me now.”   
A skeptic could argue that the shift we just described, with a formerly inert element of his 
epistemology suddenly becoming active, isn’t really an epistemological shift: both before and 
after the so-called “shift,” Jim held the same epistemological view, that everyday reasoning 
connects to mathematical formalism.  All that’s changed, by this account, is his view of how 
tractable the connection is for the problem at hand, which reflects his confidence and knowledge, 
not his views about knowledge.  For the argument we’re making, we need not contend with this 
description of Jim.  We are showing that Jim’s epistemological stance contains productive seeds 
that, when developed, could contribute to his mathematical sense-making.  If Jim’s view that a 
connection exists between formalism and everyday reasoning were always inert — if it never 
played an active role in his reasoning — then it could not serve as a productive seed.  Our point 
here is that Jim’s view does play an active role in his reasoning, in some circumstances.  
Whether or not the activation of this view counts as a “shift” is immaterial.  
Instructionally nurturing this productive seed in Jim’s epistemology could begin with 
helping him reconcile common sense with mathematical formalism over a range of situations, 
and encouraging him to reflect on his views about the connection between everyday and formal 
reasoning—with the goal of making this epistemological view active in Jim’s thinking even 
when no reconciliation between formalism and everyday reasoning is readily apparent.  
Conclusion 
We showed that Jim gets stuck and stays stuck on a hydrostatic pressure problem not 
because he lacks any of the relevant mathematical or conceptual skills/knowledge, but rather, 
because he does not engage in deep mathematical sense-making — specifically, translating and 
reconciling between mathematical and everyday/common-sense reasoning.  We argued that his 
Epistemological Dynamics/Sense-making 
Submitted to Journal of Engineering Education 
epistemological stance helps to explain his lack of mathematical sense-making:  Since he regards 
mathematical equations as much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning and does not view 
mathematical equations as expressing meaning that tractably connects to everyday reasoning, he 
does not view reconciling between common sense and mathematical formalism as either 
necessary or plausible to accomplish.  However, Jim’s epistemological stance contains 
productive seeds that instructors and instructional environments could nurture, to push him 
toward mathematical sense-making:  He does see common-sense as connected to formalism and 
in some circumstances this connection is both salient and valued. 
This case study has two main goals.  First, it adds to previous studies about the link 
between epistemologies and mathematical problem-solving by showing how a student’s 
epistemology affects his problem-solving in the moment:  Jim’s trust in formalism and his view 
that reconciling between common sense and formalism is intractably difficult contributes to his 
not only to failing to attempt such a reconciliation himself but immediately rejecting the idea 
from the interview (e.g., that h could be positive) that could have helped him achieve such a 
reconciliation.  Second, it makes plausible the claim that helping Jim — and other students like 
him — take a more productive epistemological stance toward mathematical problem-solving 
need not involve helping him develop new epistemological beliefs from scratch.  Rather, 
instructors can help students build on productive seeds already present in their epistemologies.  
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Table1: Timeline of Jimʼs interview.  
 
Appendix A: Interview protocol 
Velocity Equation (V) 
(V1) Here’s an equation you’ve probably seen in physics class: v = v0 + at.  How would 
you explain this equation to a friend from class? 
(V2) How would you explain this on an exam? .... to a 12-year old? 
[00:06]   Conversation about study and consent form. [01:46]   Jim explains the velocity equation to friend from English class.  [06:12]   Jim explains the velocity equation to a 12‐year old. [07:16]   Jim works on the two balls problems and gets the correct answer. [11:55]   Jim answers if the problem can be solved without doing calculations. [13:05]   Jim works on the units of the terms in the pressure equation.  With some help, Jim finally convinces himself that the units do match. [20:54]   Jim works quietly on comparing the pressures at depths of 5 m and 7m. [24:03]   Jim asks if h should be negative.  Ayush’s answer makes Jim think that “h” is negative and he concludes, “5 is greater, and 7 is smaller.” [24:51]   Jim sees that changing the sign of h would change his conclusion, but when asked, he does not choose between the two options. [26:01]   Jim explains that a friend from English class could argue that pressure increases with increasing depth under water. [28:28]   Prompted, Jim says he would pick the mathematics result on an exam.  Asked why, Jim explains that the mathematics results are more reliable. [29:19]   Jim acknowledges there might be a connection between the equation and the physical experience of pressure.  [29:51]   Suggested that h is positive, Jim makes the “positive‐land” remark. [30:55]   Jim says that a positive h would make his friend happy “because then their theory makes sense.” [31:17]   When asked, Jim correctly infers physical implications of a negative h. [32:38]   Asked to explain the equation to a 12‐year old, Jim laughs and says that he would explain how perceptions might not always be right. [34:33]   Alerted to the sign of “g” in the pressure equation, Jim immediately resolves the conflict around the pressure problem. [36:14]   Jim correctly compares pressures at the same depth in water for a lake on Mars versus lake on Earth. [37:29]   Brief, inconclusive conversation about comparing the pressures at the surfaces of the two lakes. [39:22]   Jim explains that he would have to understand the units to really understand an equation, not just plug in numbers. [41:22]   Jim says that algebra makes using mathematics difficult in physics course. [43:50]   Jim works on the modified Atwood’s machine problem. [49:24]   Jim makes a correct intuitive argument about the acceleration of the hanging block. [51:48]   Jim says, that photographic memory would help in grades but not in knowing the material, unless the photographic memory was eternal. [53:12]   Jim says that that a person taking the course not for grades would still need to know the equations to understand the material. [54:12]   Ayush asks what role equations play in physics. Jim expresses uncertainity about what that question means, but goes on to say that equations outline a step by step way to solve a problem. 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The Two Balls Problem (B) 
(B1) Suppose you are standing with two tennis balls in the balcony of a tall building. You 
throw one ball down with an initial speed of 2 m/s; You just let go of the other ball, i.e., just let it 
fall. I would like you to think aloud while figuring out what is the difference in the speed of the 
two balls after 5 seconds – is it less than, more than, or equal to 2 m/s? (Acceleration due to 
gravity is 10m/s2) 
(B2) Could you have answered this without doing the calculations? 
Hydrostatic Pressure Equation (P) 
(P1) Here’s an equation you perhaps haven’t yet learned.  It’s a formula for the pressure 
at a given depth under the surface of a lake, ocean, or whatever: p = pat top + ρwatergh, where pat top 
is the pressure at the surface of the water, ρwater is the density of water, and h is the distance 
below the surface.  How would you explain that equation to yourself? 
(P2) Is the pressure at h=5 meters under water greater than, less than or equal to the 
pressure at h=7 meters under water? 
(P3) Consider a lake on the surface of Mars that has weaker gravity compared to earth. 
What that means is that “g” for Mars is lower than “g” for earth which is 10 m/s2. Is the pressure 
at a depth in the earth-lake greater than, less than, or equal to the pressure at the same depth for 
the mars-lake? 
Newton’s Law problem: Modified Atwood’s machine (NL) 
(NL1) Here’s a problem you may have encountered in physics. (Frictionless everything.)   
 
(NL2) Solve for the acceleration of the 1 kg block.  (I would like you to think 
aloud as you are working on this. We’re not interested in the answer you get but in how 
you think about it. ) 
Questions probing epistemology of equations in the physics context (E) 
(E1) How do you know when you really understand an equation?  
(E2) What’s hard about learning or using the math in this physics course?   
(E3) Suppose you had photographic memory for equations.  Would that improve your 
performance?  Why?  Follow-ups would try to tease apart whether the advantage is course 
specific or a more general failure of what it means to know math in a physics context. 
(E4) Suppose a student is taking the course for fun, and not getting graded, with the goal 
of understanding physics more deeply.  He’s/She’s not interested in learning to solve the 
quantitative problems, but he’s willing to study outside of class to learn the concepts better.  
What role if any should equations play in his studying? 
(E5) Suppose you were given a list of equations on the exam – would that help you? 
